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ABSTRACT 
The last twenty-five years have seen a radical shift in the work of politically committed 
artists. No longer content to merely represent social reality, a new generation of artists has 
sought to change it, blending art with activism, social regeneration projects, and even violent 
political action. I assess how this form of contemporary art should lead us to rethink theories 
of artistic value and argue that these works make a convincing case for an often-dismissed 
position, namely, the pragmatic view of artistic value. However, the pragmatic view, when 
properly applied, sets the bar high indeed—art that tries to change society should be 
considered good art only when it succeeds in making a tangible difference. 
I. SOCIALLY USEFUL ARTWORKS 
Theaster Gates's artwork Dorchester Projects (2009–) began with a house. In 2009, Gates 
bought a rundown bungalow in Chicago's impoverished South Side and re-created it using 
repurposed materials, including timbers from defunct Chicago factories and wood from 
disused barns. By 2009, it would not have been unusual to make an artwork out of a house. 
Robert Smithson partially buried a woodshed in 1970 (Partially Buried Woodshed, 1970); in 
1993, Rachel Whiteread created a negative concrete imprint of a condemned house (House, 
1993); and Christo wrapped the German Reichstag in fabric in 1995 (Wrapped Reichstag, 
1995). Gates's modification of his house, however, was significant in that the work centered 
not on physical but social change. The rebuilt Dorchester Projects host a community center, a 
library, and a kitchen, all designed to enliven the neighborhood and affirm its self-image. It is 
this living, socially transformative aspect that marks out the identity of Gates's house as a 
work of art (Wei 2011; Gates 2012; Adams 2015). 
Insisting that the social impact is the defining feature of his artworks, Gates's artistic practice 
is typical of contemporary socially engaged artists. The feminist artist Suzanne Lacy is 
perhaps the best-known pioneer of such project-based art. In one of her earlier works, The 
Crystal Quilt (1985–1987), Lacy brought together over 400 older women in Minnesota for a 
mass performance, but the real purpose of the project was in the reactivation of this socially 
marginalized group, through the two-year period of research and workshops, which led up to 
the event. Today, a socially engaged artist might work with a group of miners to reenact a 
strike action that had been brutally suppressed by the police (Jeremy Deller, The Battle of 
Orgreave, 2001); she might mount a wind turbine on top of a railway bridge to demonstrate 
its benefits to an eco-reluctant community (Marjetica Potrč, The Wind Lift, 2014); or she 
might collaborate with a group of garbage collectors to create self-portraits, financing local 
community projects with the proceeds (Vik Muniz's Pictures of Garbage series of works, 
2008). An artwork might be a new sun-powered reading light intended for off-grid areas of 
the world (Olafur Eliasson's Little Sun, 2012), a piece of software designed to elude online 
censorship in Iran and China (Jud and Wachter's picidae, 2007), or even a violent political 
action, such as the destruction of a police vehicle (the Voina collective's Cop's Auto-da-fé, or 
Fucking Prometheus, 2011). 
Works like these have been the subject of much discussion in recent art theory and have been 
theorized under several designations, such as “the social turn,” “relational aesthetics,” 
“project-based art,” “community-based art,” “new public art,” “site-specific art,” “social 
practice,” “useful art,” and “participatory art” (Lacy 1995; Bourriaud 2002; Kwon 2002; 
Kester 2004; Jackson 2011; Bishop 2012; Doherty 2015). The present investigation will 
focus on a certain cross section of these practices, which share two characteristics: (1) the 
intended value of the art project is coextensive with its social and political impact, and (2) 
the methods utilized to produce that impact bear close resemblance to nonartistic forms of 
political and social activism. For convenience's sake, I use the term “socially engaged art” to 
refer to this group of artworks. 
Socially engaged art, I argue, poses a problem to philosophical accounts of artistic value, a 
problem at least as challenging as that posed by the ready-mades to philosophers of art in the 
1960s (Danto 1964; Dickie 1969). One among several difficulties posed by the ready-mades 
was that they were not beautiful, or, at least, they were no more beautiful than their nonart 
counterparts. Therefore, old theories conflating artistic value with aesthetic value could not 
accommodate such works (compare Stecker 2012, 355–356). Socially engaged art presents a 
new challenge. Unlike ready-mades, these works worryingly disregard the confines of the 
artworld and aim to be judged for their social usefulness. As I argue, this upsets the broadly 
held assumption that artistic value is something we assess from within the sphere of art. 
First, I offer a brief history of socially engaged art within the context of recent advanced art 
practices. I argue for a synthesis of two historical narratives—Miwon Kwon's and Jason 
Gaiger's—that I think crucial for understanding the appeal of this kind of art and its linkage 
to art of previous eras. I then consider two broad accounts of artistic value in Anglophone 
philosophy—aestheticism and pluralism—and argue that socially engaged art presents a 
challenge to both accounts. Instead, I offer an account of artistic value usually dismissed as 
untenable—the pragmatic view—as a way of accounting for this kind of art. After 
considering objections that socially engaged art is not art, or is bad art, I conclude that such 
art indeed suggests we should expand our conception of what artistic value can be. 
II. HOW WE GOT TO SOCIALLY ENGAGED ART 
In the opening chapter of One Place After Another, Miwon Kwon offers a short genealogy of 
the project-based, socially engaged art (Kwon 2002, 11–33). This trajectory covers the period 
between the 1960s and the 1990s and charts the way in which artists responded to the 
Western (and especially New York-based) conception of advanced art as modernist 
abstraction. Certainly, this story only partially accounts for the social turn. In today's 
globalized artworld one should also take stock of the histories of socially engaged art in the 
former Eastern bloc and in the global South (see Bishop 2012 for a more comprehensive 
history). However, since New York has undeniably dominated the Western art production 
during the Cold War, this is one relevant story to tell here. Western socially engaged art in 
this period, therefore, did not merely have the task of commenting on pertinent social 
problems but also had to justify its status as art in relation to the New York modernist 
paradigm: in relation to the idea that the truly progressive art constantly interrogates the 
conventions of artistic practice itself. For Kwon, the crucial notion linking socially engaged 
art to preceding advanced art movements is the artists’ interrogation of the artwork's physical 
location and its manner of display: its ‘site.’ 
The first stage of the investigation of the work's site was, as Kwon puts it, 
“phenomenological,” and she identifies it with post-object art such as Minimalist, land art, 
and Conceptual art practices of the 1960s (Kwon 2002, 12–13). Artists such as Carl Andre, 
Sol LeWitt, Robert Smithson, Donald Judd, Robert Morris, and Eva Hesse challenged the 
modernist, white cube gallery model of art display of the 1950s, according to which aesthetic 
experience was supposed to occur in an uninterrupted interaction between the viewer and the 
colossal, self-contained abstract canvasses and sculptures. Instead, these artists emphasized 
dynamic ways in which the work can interact with its environment. Smithson's Partially 
Buried Woodshed, mentioned above, is typical. Unlike a sculpture on a pedestal, no viewer 
can experience Smithson's shed in isolation from its challenging and changing environment. 
The next generation of artists, now known under the label “institutional critique,” took the 
engagement with the work's site a step further. They came to query the social and political, 
rather than merely aesthetic, conditions for the work's display (Kwon 2002, 14–24). In this 
way, Mierle Laderman Ukeles's pieces often drew attention to the (gendered) labor relations 
that allowed the display of art in the first place. For example, in her “Maintenance Art” 
performances (1973), Ukeles presented the cleaning of the museum as an artwork in itself. 
Hans Haacke, Andrea Fraser, Marcel Broodthaers, Christo, and others associated with 
institutional critique—which flourished in the more politically activated artworld of the 
1970s—often attempted similar artistic exposés of the political conditions of the work's site. 
This leads Kwon to explain how socially engaged art, taking off in the early 1990s, came to 
become so readily accepted in the contemporary art world. One of her case studies is the 
1993 “Culture in Action” program by the Sculpture Chicago organization, for which curator 
Mary Jane Jacob, instead of displaying conventional sculptures, commissioned artists to team 
up with communities to tackle local issues, organize workshops, and put on political marches 
(Kwon 2002, 28–29, 101–137). Works included the HaHa Collective growing food for AIDS 
patients (Flood, 1993); Simon Grennan and Christopher Sperandio collaborating with a candy 
factory workers’ union to create and market a chocolate bar (The Workforce Makes the Candy 
of Their Dreams, 1993); and Iñigo Manglano-Ovalle's Tele-Vecindario (1992–1993), a 
project teaching teenagers how to make videos. For Kwon, such works again engage their 
site. The difference is that permissible sites for contemporary work now include not just the 
gallery but its nonartistic context as well, whether this be the local community or a broader 
political effort. Though Kwon does not specifically use the term “social engagement,” but 
prefers to discuss this art under the label “site-specificity,” her third paradigm—the primary 
focus of her book—clearly extends to socially engaged art mentioned above. 
Jason Gaiger offers an alternative narrative to Kwon's three stages. He agrees that there is an 
interesting trajectory uniting the successive movements of post-object art, institutional 
critique, and the project-based socially engaged artworks but applies critical pressure on 
Kwon's usage of the term ‘site’ (Gaiger 2009, 49–54). Gaiger takes issue with Kwon 
describing socially engaged art as active within a “discursively determined site that is 
delineated as a field of knowledge, intellectual exchange, or cultural debate” (Kwon 2002, 
26). These works, for Kwon, no longer react only to the specific site of the gallery but 
contribute to broader political efforts and debates. However, Gaiger complains, to 
characterize the site of such art as ‘discourse’ is to provide too imprecise a criterion. As he 
persuasively argues, even premodernist figurative art could be plausibly construed as 
engaging the work's site in Kwon's terms, since much of that art was engaged in a wider field 
of discourse. Think of Hogarth, Goya, Courbet, or Manet: their work undoubtedly 
participated in some broader political and cultural debate. So, by Kwon's characterization, 
they too should count as engaging their ‘site’ in the discursive sense. 
Gaiger is therefore led to unstitch Kwon's trajectory from Minimalism to socially engaged art 
along different seams. The useful concept for describing this shift, he claims, is not according 
to the work's site but rather as a shift away from the demands of 
artistic autonomy (Gaiger 2009, 52). Artistic autonomy (self-governance) is a normative 
doctrine about artistic value. One way of stating the doctrine would be to say that art is 
intrinsically valuable and should therefore not be held accountable to some external standard, 
such as the demands of a political movement, state, religion, or field of knowledge.1Gaiger 
suggests that this doctrine has, over the past fifty years, been gradually revised in the world of 
Western advanced art and that this can be seen in the trajectory leading up to the social turn. 
The post-object Minimalists and Conceptual artists of the 1960s reacted specifically against 
the dogma of artistic autonomy as theorized by Clement Greenberg in his account of 
modernism. For Greenberg and the critics he influenced, artistic value was based on the 
viewer's absorption in the formal, medium-specific features of the work itself. Greenberg's 
analysis of New York school abstract painters like Jackson Pollock is typical in this regard: 
what Greenberg appreciated was the sense of dynamism and energy created purely by 
consideration of the relations between the shapes on the flat canvas (Greenberg 1986–1993, 
72–74, 200–202, vol. 2; 106–107, 217–235, vol. 3). Post-object artists, such as Minimalists 
and Conceptualists, and Robert Smithson in the example above, are crucial because they chip 
away at this scheme by canceling the importance of the work's intrinsic features. While the 
main concern of their work was still broadly speaking with the aesthetic experience, post-
object art facilitated the experience through means external to the work: the location, the 
viewer's body, the relations between the two. Once this step is taken, however, artistic 
autonomy can be further enervated. The next assumption under pressure is the thought that 
artistic value is chiefly based on the work's aesthetic interest. In the 1960s and later, Western 
advanced artists opened art to institutional critique and to broader political commentary, and, 
as Gaiger argues, this development further depreciates artistic autonomy. By the 1990s, 
advanced art practices are clearly no longer evaluated merely on aesthetic terms but in terms 
of their contribution to live political and cultural debates. As Gaiger puts it: 
In short, it is opposition to the modernist conception of aesthetic autonomy—rather than the 
increasingly tenuous conception of a ‘site’—that links the different parts of Kwon's account 
together and which establishes a line of continuity between the minimalist and post-
minimalist practices of the 1960s and contemporary project-based art. (Gaiger 2009, 53–54) 
Kwon and Gaiger, then, both offer narratives that show how the recent social turn is 
continuous with central concerns in the history of Western advanced art after World War II. I 
do not so much wish to assess who of the two provides a better theoretical framework as to 
suggest that they should be combined. 
Gaiger usefully inscribes Kwon's trajectory within the broader theme of artistic autonomy, 
which has been more central to art historical narratives of the twentieth century than the 
category of site.2 However, there is a danger, in Gaiger's account, in bringing recent history 
of art full circle. Gaiger considers contemporary project-based art to be a “partial restitution” 
of previous politically committed art movements, such as naturalism and realism at the end of 
the nineteenth century and Russian Constructivism and Dada at the beginning of the 
twentieth (Gaiger 2009, 51, 55). This suggestion overlooks an important point about the 
recent social turn, implicit in Kwon's claim that the site of these works is broader political 
discourse and action. The “dominant drive,” as she puts it, of these works is “a pursuit of a 
more intense engagement with the outside world and everyday life,” in a way that treats 
“aesthetic and art historical concerns as secondary issues” (Kwon 2002, 24). The project-
based works by Theaster Gates, Marjetica Potrč, Vik Muniz, and others do not (merely) 
comment on politics through an artistic medium, as realist painters have done. And while 
they may be following in the footsteps of the historical avant-gardes, like the Dadaists who 
attempted to “merge” art and life (compare Bürger 1984, 49–50), socially engaged artists do 
not do so through anti-rational, experimental performances. Instead, these artists dedicate 
themselves pragmatically to measurable impact, aligning their art with social work, activism, 
or technology development. 
I would therefore like to suggest a synthesis of Kwon's and Gaiger's accounts. Gaiger adds to 
Kwon's account by plausibly mapping it onto a shift in critical evaluation of art. This is a 
shift from artistic autonomy—the principle of art being evaluated by its own standards—to 
what we might call artistic heteronomy, or the principle that art should be evaluated by 
standards of other fields, such as politics, religion, ethics, and knowledge. What Kwon's 
analysis shows, however, is that the result has been more radical than Gaiger allows for. 
Attempting to directly engage its political context, socially engaged art aligns artistic activity 
with political action to a level virtually without precedent. I now turn to the challenge that 
this presents to the philosophical definition of artistic value. 
III. SOCIALLY ENGAGED ART AND ARTISTIC VALUE 
The majority of philosophical positions on what artistic value is can be classified as 
belonging to two broad camps. Aestheticism is united on the view that only aesthetic values 
can contribute to a work's artistic value (for example, Beardsley 1958; Lamarque and 
Olsen 1994; Budd 1996; Zangwill 2007; Scruton 2009). Pluralism, by contrast, allows artistic 
value to comprise a wider variety of values, including aesthetic, epistemic, ethical, political, 
and more (for example, Nussbaum 1990; Stecker 1997; Kieran 2005a; Robinson 2005; 
Gaut 2007). It should be noted these two camps do not exhaust the logical space of possible 
views. Outside of the present scope, we find nihilism about artistic value (artistic value is 
never realized) or nonaesthetic monism (the view that only one nonaesthetic kind of value 
contributes to artistic value). However, aestheticism and pluralism do draw the lines of most 
of the recent debates. 
Louise Hanson recently offered what I think is the clearest neutral definition of artistic value, 
one that should be agreed by all the above positions. Artistic value, Hanson says, is “the thing 
that by definition, artworks have just to the extent that they are good art” (2013, 502). What 
this captures is that when we talk about artworks, we talk about them as good or bad art, and 
often compare their merits as better or worse. The dispute between available substantive 
positions is, then, a dispute about what kinds of value contribute to artistic value, and under 
what conditions (compare Hanson 2013, 504, 507–508). I will accept Hanson's claim, and I 
will additionally take it that any substantive position on artistic value should therefore follow 
some form like this: 
(Artistic value) Value V, possessed by artwork X, is an artistic value ←→ V is a value of the 
kind Y, and V is realized under conditions Z. 
While aestheticism insists that Y be aesthetic value narrowly construed, pluralism is more 
liberal as to what kinds of value can count as V. I now wish to suggest that proponents of 
aestheticism and pluralism have tended to agree on a further interesting point. 
This point pertains to the conditions Z under which artistic values must be realized. Namely, 
for pluralists and aestheticists alike, artistic values are not the values that artworks 
have simpliciter, but only the values that are realized through characteristically artistic 
features, specific to the work's medium, genre, theme, technique, mode of display, or art kind. 
For example, among aestheticists, Monroe Beardsley's analysis shows how aesthetic values in 
painting are achieved through, inter alia, the use of color, representation of depth, rules of 
composition, and the relationship between depicted objects and the shape of the canvas 
(Beardsley 1958, 168–173, 92–96, 205–209). Among pluralists, Robert Stecker considers as 
characteristically artistic “[the] sort of exploration of its subject matter [the work] provides”; 
“what it requires its audience to imagine and to feel,” and—in the case of literature—how it 
succeeds in doing so “in virtue of its literary properties such as vivid description” 
(Stecker 2012, 358; original emphasis). Sometimes such restrictions on artistic value are 
described as the value something has as art. Malcolm Budd, an aestheticist, discusses the 
“value as art” as the value of the experience, which is arrived at through an appropriate 
understanding of the work. Here, “proper” understanding seems to rely on appreciation of 
features such as a painting's tonality, symbolism, and formal arrangement (Budd 1996, 1–8, 
14–16, 41–43). Berys Gaut, a pluralist who discusses ethical and cognitive value, aligns 
“value qua art” with those properties we attend to in art-critical discourse (Gaut 2007, 34–37, 
95ff, 166f). In Gaut's analysis of two treatments of the Bath of Bathsheba from Rembrandt's 
workshop, this includes attending to the theme of the sitter's inner life as achieved through 
features such as tonal harmony and expressive brushwork (Gaut 2007, 87–89). Similarly, 
pluralists who defend the cognitive value of literature customarily specify that their 
arguments must show how such value is arrived at in virtue of specifically literary features of 
the work: those that distinguish literature from prosaic modes of description (compare 
John 2013, 384–385). 
All these writers, then, despite significant differences in their theories, tend to agree that a 
value realized by a work of art counts toward its artistic value under such limited conditions. 
This point is also often expressed by distinguishing between the work's artistic and pragmatic 
value (Lamarque 2013, 56; compare Lopes 2011, 521). For example, a novel may be ethically 
and cognitively valuable because it happens to contain a folk recipe for a medicine, or a 
painting may be aesthetically valuable because it conceals a hideous scene previously painted 
on the canvas. Such values do not make the work good art, since they are not realized in 
virtue of such artistic features as we saw enumerated above. 
In short, I would like to describe the view shared by pluralists and aestheticists as the demand 
for the following condition: that only the values that a work realizes as art—that is, through 
recognizably artistic features—count toward artistic value. Until recently, such a contention 
would have perhaps seemed unremarkable. However, not long ago, Dominic Lopes 
challenged the view that artistic value is value “as art” (Lopes 2014, Chapter 5, especially 
90–100).3Lopes argues that “as art” is too broad a category to be useful and that only 
individual arts, on the basis of their specific medium profiles, are restrictive enough to allow 
us to measure achievement (Lopes 2014, 103). For Lopes, there is therefore only musical, 
painterly, literary (and so on) value, and “artistic value” is merely a disjunctive term 
encompassing all of these. 
Personally, I am not sure whether Lopes's is a new position or rather a more explicit 
statement of something that has already been accepted by pluralists and aestheticists alike. It 
seems that most writers acknowledge that what we count among the work's artistic features is 
going to depend considerably—though not exclusively—on the medium-specific art kind in 
question (for example, Gaut 2007, 88). Therefore, the disagreement seems to be one of 
emphasis. Lopes seems to think, somewhat like Clement Greenberg used to, that the relevant 
artistic features gather around the medium profile of one of the arts (Lopes 2014, 159–162); 
other philosophers might allow that some artistic features, such as themes and genre-specific 
features, may be shared between various arts. 
My point for now, then, is that all these philosophically diverse accounts of artistic value 
place some “as art” restriction on the realization of artistic value. One might describe this 
“value as art” consensus, adhered to by both aestheticism and pluralism, as filling in the 
conditions Z in (Artistic value), above, as follows: 
(Value as art) Value V, possessed by artwork X, is an artistic value ←→ V is a value of the 
kind Y, and V is realized through features specific to the work's medium, genre, theme, 
technique, modes of display, art kind, or other artistic features. 
What follows from Lopes's discussion is that it is certainly difficult to point out which 
features count as properly “artistic” and that one might debate as to whether the work's 
medium should hold some privileged position among them. Indeed, as the arts evolve and the 
borders between them change, these issues have been much disputed. A case in point is 
ready-mades, which retain little that is recognizably artistic other than the mode of display in 
the gallery and the “atmosphere” of art interpretation that goes with it (compare Danto 1964, 
579–581). 
This formulation of the consensus, however, enables us to see clearly the extent to which 
socially engaged artworks present us with a new and deep-going philosophical challenge. By 
assimilating themselves to the “site” of political action and discourse and by radically 
departing from claims of artistic autonomy (to combine Kwon's and Gaiger's terms), these 
works have controversially dispensed with the idea that what makes something good art 
should be realized through any features specific to the sphere of art. Instead, it seems, these 
works embrace a pragmatic view about art, a position that we might describe as follows:4 
(Pragmatic view) Value V, possessed by artwork X, is an artistic value ←→ V is the 
positive political, cognitive, or ethical impact of X. 
Where the pragmatic view differs from aestheticism is in the kind of value it takes artistic 
value to be. Where the pragmatic view differs from both aestheticism and pluralism is in 
omitting the demand that artistic values should be realized through characteristically artistic 
features. In Suzanne Lacy's, Theaster Gates's, Iñigo Manglano-Ovalle's, or Vik Muniz's 
project-based works discussed above, their claim to being good artworks is based on the 
social strengthening of the communities they engage with. In the technological artworks of 
Olafur Eliasson, Marjetica Potrč, or Jud and Wachter, their claim to being good artworks is 
based on the impact their artworks have for the people who use them. Can such a position, 
and thereby the status of socially engaged artworks as good art, be made philosophically 
respectable? 
IV. SOCIALLY ENGAGED ART DEFENDED 
Above, I stated that socially engaged art “embraces” the pragmatic view. To put this point 
more clearly, I now argue that the existence of good socially engaged artworks favors the 
pragmatic view, since only this view can explain their artistic value. Similarly, the existence 
of artistically good but nonaesthetic works of art favors pluralism over aestheticism, since 
aestheticism cannot explain the value of such works. Here I do not mean to argue that the 
pragmatic view is the correct position to take with regard to the artistic value of all artworks 
(nor do I think that would be a sensible position). However, I want to show that it can be 
sensibly applied to socially engaged art. The structure of my argument is simple: 
 1.Socially engaged artworks are works of art. 
 2.Some socially engaged artworks are good art. 
 3.Aestheticism and pluralism cannot explain how socially engaged artworks can be 
good art. 
 4.The pragmatic view of artistic value can explain how socially engaged artworks can 
be good art. 
 5.Therefore, the pragmatic view is a valid account of artistic value. 
I now defend premises (1)–(4) and then offer some qualifications on what has been achieved. 
First, one might object to premise (1). Socially engaged artworks, the objection goes, no 
longer appear to be art in any meaningful sense. Instead, they have fully assimilated 
themselves into nonart fields of activity. Therefore, philosophical accounts of artistic value 
need not take notice of them. 
This objection points to the definitional issue of what it is for something to be a work of art. It 
should be noted that aestheticist definitions of art, which define art as human artifacts 
intended to realize aesthetic value, would likely reject socially engaged art altogether 
(compare Beardsley 1982, 299). However, this point is dialectically moot. One cannot 
espouse a value-based definition of art to argue against a rival, pragmatic theory of artistic 
value without begging the question. We must therefore look to value-neutral definitions of 
art, such as historical and institutional definitions, to adjudicate on this issue. 
For example, according to Jerrold Levinson's historical definition of art, something is an 
artwork if it is intended to be regarded in some way in which artworks of the past were 
standardly regarded (Levinson 1979). Here, Kwon's analysis is pertinent, since it explains 
that socially engaged art is regarded as engaging with its site. In this respect, these works are 
continuous with post-object works such as Minimalist sculpture, which dominated the 
production of advanced art in the 1960s. Gaiger's analysis places socially engaged art within 
an even longer trajectory of heteronomous art. Even though I argued that the most recent 
social turn represents a radical outcome of that lineage, it would be correct to say that these 
works are intended to be regarded as contributing to political outcomes, much as French 
realist works did in the mid-nineteenth century or Russian Constructivism in the early 
twentieth. Other genealogies of socially engaged art emphasize the collaborative and 
participatory element of these works, which can be traced to the Situationist International in 
the 1950s, happenings in the 1960s, and feminist participatory practices in the 1970s 
(Kester 2004; Bishop 2012). Therefore, to the extent that the historical definitions of art aim 
to accommodate continuity as well as innovation, these are precisely the criteria that socially 
engaged works fulfill. 
On the other hand, the institutional definitions of art—of which George Dickie is a well-
known exponent—claim that something is art if it is accepted as such by members of art 
institutions (Dickie 1969). Though the early socially engaged works were experimental and 
marginal, this kind of work has been since thoroughly embraced by the art establishment: 
Theaster Gates is represented by high-profile commercial galleries; international exhibitions 
like documenta routinely feature socially engaged work; projects like Eliasson's Little Sun are 
enthusiastically embraced by museums like Tate Modern. True, these project-based works do 
exit the artworld in the sense that they take place in the broader political sphere rather than in 
the gallery. Nevertheless, they are validated as art by artworld participants both through art 
discourse and by showing documentation of social projects in traditional gallery spaces. 
One might reply to both lines of defense that we resist categorizing socially engaged works as 
art not because of their novelty but because of their success as members of another, nonart 
category. Imagine a cook experimenting with sweet appetizers. Her cocoa-coated spicy 
carrots may still just about qualify as an appetizer, but if she ends up making a full-blown 
carrot cake, it seems she has failed in producing an appetizer because she produced a dessert. 
Similarly, we might resist accepting socially engaged artworks as art because they are 
something else: social projects or works of activism. These works migrated into another, 
nonart sphere entirely. 
On reflection, however, I do not think this objection works. Things can belong to multiple 
categories: something might be a religious object and art, a piece of erotica and art, or a piece 
of plumbing and art (as with Duchamp's Fountain). What is wrong with carrot cake as an 
appetizer, among other things, is that it is both institutionally and historically an aberration 
among appetizers, not that it is a lovely dessert. Just think of sliced melon, which can be both. 
What matters for categorizing socially engaged artworks as art, then, is that they are 
historically and institutionally enmeshed with the artworld, not whether they also succeed as 
social projects. 
On at least some respectable definitions of art, then, socially engaged artworks are art, and 
should be included in discussions about artistic value. Another way to defuse the motivation 
for the pragmatic view would be to maintain that these works—while art—are simply not 
good art: these works are marginal and eye-rollingly awful attempts at social do-goodery 
created by deeply confused individuals. If one feels this way, then aestheticism and pluralism, 
and any view subscribing to the “as art” consensus, can conveniently explain why that is. 
These works are bad because they fail to realize any value by distinctly artistic means. 
Dialectically, this objection leads to a stalemate. Different accounts of artistic value are 
supposed to account for good works of art; a contest between them presupposes that we agree 
on which works are good. To move beyond the stalemate, one could motivate the case for 
socially engaged art in two ways. 
First, one can point to the growing popularity of such works. Though several of the cases 
discussed in the literature have indeed appeared in relatively marginal festivals with little 
broad popularity, other cases of socially engaged art have been more widely appreciated. 
Theaster Gates's housing projects have, for example, received broad exposure in the media, 
and Vik Muniz's Pictures of Garbage series was the subject of an acclaimed 
documentary, Waste Land (2010). 
Second, one could point to the fact that enthusiasm for direct political efficacy has in fact 
spread from socially engaged art to many corners of contemporary art. Consider Ai 
Weiwei's Fairytale (2007) performance for Documenta 12: the work consisted of the artist 
bringing one thousand and one Chinese citizens, selected from over three thousand 
applicants, to Kassel. This performance was rich with symbolic resonances. The 
documentation of the journeys referenced the magical journeys found in the fairy tales of the 
brothers Grimm, who spent their formative years in Kassel; the exhibition included a display 
of a thousand and one wooden chairs, which signified the ‘invisible’ presence of Chinese 
migrants who anonymously intermingled with the visitors. Ai also showed a companion 
piece: a large structure made of Qing and Ming dynasty doors, taken from buildings that had 
to be destroyed to make way for new constructions (Template, 2007). It would certainly be 
possible to appreciate Fairytale as a complex piece of participatory performance and 
installation. However, for all these nods to artistic autonomy, the documenta catalogue also 
described the work as simply facilitating a cultural exchange program, enabling one thousand 
and one people to experience Europe's culture and political system (documenta 12 catalogue, 
208). 
Thus, if one wants to dismiss socially engaged artworks as marginal and claim they are 
therefore not candidates for good art, one will still find that a kindred desire for direct social 
relevance underpins even the more mainstream contemporary works, such as Ai's. Socially 
engaged art can, then, be thought of as a limiting case that most clearly outlines a new, 
pragmatic view of artistic value. However, such a view also underlies other contemporary 
artists’ thinking about what makes a work of art good or worthwhile. 
Finally, one could deny the third premise: socially engaged art is capable of being good art, 
but either aestheticism or pluralism can explain its value. Here we should first note that there 
are some works of participatory art, which also include interaction with audience members 
or local communities, but the primary goal of which is to create a remarkable aesthetic 
experience for the participants; some works by Tino Sehgal, Kateřina Šedá, Marina 
Abramović, and Rirkrit Tiravanija are like this. Some version of aestheticism or pluralism 
may well be appropriate for considering this important genre (see Hegenbart 2016). However, 
even though such participatory practices do overlap with socially engaged art in terms of how 
they are displayed and curated, we should at least in principle distinguish between 
aesthetically minded participatory works and the socially activist works that have been my 
focus here. The goal of the latter is not necessarily to intensify the participants’ aesthetic 
experience but to generate measurable social change. 
Turning now to the socially activist works under discussion, it therefore seems clear that 
aestheticism cannot account for their value. However, perhaps pluralism can, and the art 
historian Claire Bishop seems to suggests the beginnings of a pluralist approach. Though 
Bishop is sympathetic to socially engaged art, she criticizes curators Charles Esche and Maria 
Lind for assessing artistic community projects only according to their political efficacy, but 
not also “as art.” Rather than simply assessing socially engaged art as politics, “[it] is also 
crucial,” Bishop suggests, “to discuss, analyse and compare this work critically as art, since 
this is the institutional field in which it is endorsed and disseminated.” Accordingly, Bishop 
praises the “artistic work” in the case of Jeremy Deller's Battle of Orgreave (2012, 13, 17, 
22, 33; original emphases). Deller's project involved gathering oral accounts of police 
brutality to create a historical archive told from the miners’ perspective, but its central piece 
was a large-scale reenactment of the confrontation between the striking miners and the police, 
using some of those originally affected by the strike as performers. As well as socially 
relevant, Bishop suggests that Deller's work can therefore be considered as a sort of hybrid 
between a piece of performance art and a history painting (30–37). To give another example, 
Vik Muniz's collaboration with the garbage pickers of Rio de Janeiro, Pictures of Garbage, 
incorporated traditional artistic tools even more explicitly and so perhaps provides an even 
stronger case in point. Muniz assembled rubbish into portraits that recalled art historical 
references; for example, Marat (Sebastião) is a portrait of a garbage picker that recalls 
Jacques-Louis David's The Death of Marat (1793). Photographs of these assemblages were 
then sold, as high-end gallery art, and the money was distributed to the garbage pickers to 
finance various community projects. 
Even, though it is possible to detect elements of performance, installation, or even portraiture 
in socially engaged work (works of Suzanne Lacy, Tania Bruguera, and Thomas Hirschhorn 
could furnish us with further examples), it is important to discern the manner in which these 
features are exploited. The portraits made by Muniz are ingenious, but as is made clear in 
the Waste Landdocumentary, Muniz's main goal was to lend his skills, fame, and whatever 
else was required to improve the lot of the people he worked with. The success of these 
works as portraits appeared to be a secondary concern; Muniz's primary goal appeared to be 
to create anything likeable that would raise as much money as possible. Theaster Gates's 
attitude toward his sculptural output is even more pragmatic, indeed cynical: the sale of his 
art objects to affluent collectors simply finances his social projects (Adams 2015). Deller's 
project might indeed be appreciated as a kind of tableau vivant by an onlooker in the art 
context, for example, when the video documentation of the work is presented in galleries. 
However, pace Bishop, Deller's primary goal appears to have been to make a difference to 
the original participants, who were possibly quite unconcerned with the work's artworld 
status. That is even more obviously the case with the “Culture in Action” works discussed by 
Kwon. 
To map this discussion onto my argument, recall that pluralism is the view that artistic value 
encompasses a variety of values, realized through recognizably artistic features. Now, 
pluralism is a broad church of views, so I am willing to concede that some pluralists might 
find resources to accommodate socially engaged art. However, the discussion shows at least 
three reasons why this is difficult; it is important to note these, because it is important to 
understand just how radical a break these works represent. First, in socially engaged art 
traditional artistic features (such as the production of portraits by Vik Muniz) may be present, 
but they are used as an interchangeable means to an end (they fund social projects or bring a 
community together), rather than as a means through which a value is realized. It is as if we 
used a heavy statue to hit an opponent on the head, rather than expressed dissent through the 
medium of sculpture. The procedure here is therefore quite different from the way in which 
pluralists usually discuss artistic value as arising through artistic work. Second, any such 
traditional artistic features are always accompanied by features that are commonly found 
outside the sphere of art, such as organizing a protest, creating an archive, or rebuilding a 
neighborhood. It is the values realized through such means that pluralist accounts will have 
trouble accommodating. Third, the features that allow us to classify socially engaged art as 
art—such as their institutional acceptance as art—are, interestingly, not the features essential 
to the realization of their value. Socially engaged artworks are certainly discussed in art 
magazines and appreciated when documented in museums, and these venues may be used to 
publicize the political message. However, the bulk of these works’ achievement is based on 
the difference they make to constituencies outside of these contexts: to the former mining 
community (Deller) or to the garbage pickers (Muniz). Note that the challenge here is 
different to ready-mades. With Duchamp's Fountain, the institutional context was essential to 
realizing its humor and message; that gallery context is mostly irrelevant to the difference 
socially engaged works made to their users. This is precisely what their democratic appeal 
consists in. 
To sum up, given the popularity and acclaim achieved by socially engaged art over the last 
few decades, I propose that philosophical theories of artistic value cannot dismiss such work 
as “not art” or “bad art.” Moreover, if we take seriously the intent of these art practices to 
make a difference to the political process, then the value of these works ought to be assessed 
pragmatically: a socially engaged artwork is good art simply to the extent that it realizes a 
politically valuable end, regardless of the means the work employs. 
V. QUALIFICATIONS AND THE PRAGMATIC VIEW IN PRACTICE 
A theory of artistic value can make a claim to universal validity, or it can limit itself to a 
subsection of art. Thus, one and the same person might argue for pluralism in relation to 
literature but aestheticism in relation to absolute music (compare Kieran 2005b, 298). My 
goal here has been to show how one vital strand of contemporary art legitimizes the 
pragmatic conception of artistic value. My claim is not, of course, that this renders the 
pragmatic view an acceptable theory of all art. As I noted, even among contemporary 
participatory practices there are some more aestheticized works (Sehgal, Abramović, Šedá, 
Tiravanija). The value of these is either aesthetic or else resides in that hybrid aesthetic–
ethical realm, traced by some pluralists. That is all perfectly all right; I merely want to 
suggest that in a significant subsection of our artistic production we have also come to think 
about artistic value pragmatically, in terms of the work's tangible social impact. These 
distinctions, I hope, should be illuminative for philosophers of art but also for those in the 
contemporary artworld who want to characterize more precisely what is at stake in these new 
art forms. 
In this respect, I want to now illustrate the consequences of this philosophical discussion for 
art criticism. When properly taken on board, the pragmatic view is in fact a highly demanding 
system for assessing artistic value. If socially engaged artists intend to bring about a certain 
positive sociopolitical change, then we should judge their work not only in comparison to 
other artworks but within a broader context of political activity. Here we may detect a certain 
malpractice, or even a kind of hypocrisy, which appears to be rife in contemporary art. 
Curators and critics routinely praise socially engaged artworks as if their commitment to 
social progress alone already constituted an accomplishment. Elsewhere, they occupy a kind 
of halfway position, reverting to aesthetic criteria when a socially enaged work fails 
politically. Claire Bishop rightly complains when she writes: “The aspiration is always to 
move beyond art, but never to the point of comparison with comparable projects in the social 
domain” (Bishop 2012, 19). Bishop's own solution is to search for artistic features in socially 
engaged artworks, but my alternative (and perhaps more radical) pragmatic proposal is 
precisely to insist that for this subset of artistic production we should evaluate art by means 
of its impact, that is, by comparing it with “nonart” political initiatives. 
Once such a comparison is made, it can become clearer to what extent and which socially 
engaged artworks have been effective. For example, though many of the works presented at 
the Culture in Action program were pioneering, most were woefully inefficient, with the 
artists lacking the infrastructure and expertise necessary to carry out their ideas in a sustained 
and impactful way. Only one project, Manglano-Ovalle's video workshops with local youth 
gang members, Tele-Vecindario, appears to have made any lasting difference to the 
community with which it engaged (Kwon 2002, 101–137; Kester 2004, 117; Bishop 2012, 
205–206). More recently, when Olafur Eliasson—one of the best-known contemporary 
installation artists working with light—presented his Little Sun, a handheld torch intended for 
off-grid areas, this was met with much fanfare. One reviewer gushed: “If Olafur Eliasson can 
enlighten those of us who have time and resources to devote to art, well and good; but if he 
can literally enlighten places of darkness, that must be more valuable” (Flanders 2012). But 
are we certain that this work is making a significant difference? Possibly; but I was unable to 
find any reviews that tried to assess the project more systematically. For example, Alfredo 
Moser, a Brazilian mechanic, invented an ingenious bleach-based “bottled light,” which can 
be easily installed in corrugated roofs and provides indoor light in off-grid areas 
(Zobel 2013). An NGO called Liter of Light has since then been installing these lights 
worldwide. Eliasson's project might very well be worthwhile, but a critical assessment of 
socially engaged art should include comparisons with such nonart enterprises and an 
empirical assessment of the work's impact. Further, Vik Muniz's portraits of the garbage 
pickers of Rio are certainly heartwarming, as the film critics reviewing the Oscar-nominated 
documentary about it noted. As a social project, however, one might worry that the project 
amounted to little more than an arbitrary, Santa-Claus-style charity event: some of the 
workers Muniz collaborated with received huge amounts of money, but it is not clear what 
long-term difference this made to the community. Before we get too enthusiastic about the 
“transformative power” of art, as the advertising copy for the film about Muniz's work 
suggests, we should think seriously about each social artwork's actual political and ethical 
impact. 
One consequence of the pragmatic view, then, is to call for a more rigorous practice in art 
criticism of socially engaged art. We have entered a paradigm whereby artistic resources can 
be freely marshaled in support of political ends, and that is good; however, I suspect much 
socially engaged work currently fêted at biennales would not stand up to the kind of scrutiny 
we subject nonart social projects to. Perhaps works such as those by Suzanne Lacy, Theaster 
Gates, or the Voina collective may be looked to as models, given that they seem to constitute 
a genuine political challenge to the authorities or a genuine improvement in the lives of the 
communities in which they intervene. If socially engaged artworks are to be good art, they 
ought to make a real difference. 
 
Notes 
 
1.  
Gaiger (2009, 52) calls this view aesthetic autonomy. Given that I discuss aestheticism 
below, under a slightly different definition, I shall here omit this designation. See also Gaiger 
(2013). 
2.  
See especially Peter Bürger's analysis of the avant-gardes (1984, 35–37, 46–47, 54) and 
responses to it (for example, Foster 1996, 1–34). 
3.  
For an earlier paper and debate see Lopes (2011), Stecker (2012), and Hanson (2013). 
4.  
Note that my usage of ‘pragmatic’ here has nothing to do with the philosophical tradition of 
American pragmatism. Also note that it might also be possible to formulate a pragmatic 
position for other kinds of value (prurient? commercial? aesthetic?), but for now I will stay 
with the formulation that traces political, cognitive, and ethical values central to socially 
engaged art. 
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